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Toward Intervocality: Linklater, the Body, and Contemporary Feminist 
Theory 
Abstract: 
This article inaugurates a conversation between the fields of voice training and contemporary 
feminist theories of the body. The article begins with a consideration of the development of 
Kristin Linklater’s highly influential work Freeing the Natural Voice, and the significant 
advancements it represented in the field of voice. The article proceeds to a description of the 
field of contemporary feminist theories of the body, highlighting those insights and 
developments that either resonate most clearly with Linklater’s work or represent promising 
avenues for the next evolution of voice training. Those theories share Linklater’s rejection of 
Western dualism, but also cast doubt on any references to the natural (i.e., pre-political) body, 
including references to the natural voice. The article then argues that such evolution should take 
up more directly the relationality of the voice (what the article terms “intervocality”), an 
understanding of the body as ineluctably embedded within social and political dynamics, and a 
recognition of the profound influence of structural inequality on both vocality in general and 
vocal training in particular. The article concludes by gesturing toward a model of vocal 
generosity that may provide a framework for that next evolution. 
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Introduction 
We seek to inaugurate a conversation between two streams of thought/practice: one grounded in 
the professional practice of voice training and the other in the academic field of feminist 
philosophy. Although we expect this conversation ultimately to address a wide variety of 
questions, and a broad scope of practitioners and thinkers, here we are focused on deploying the 
conceptual tools of contemporary feminist philosophies of the body to illuminate Kristin 
Linklater’s approach to vocal freedom and to shape the next evolution of that approach. While 
this article introduces contemporary feminist philosophies of the body to the field of voice 
training, subsequent pieces will reverse the direction of the introduction, and position voice work 
as a site of thought and practice that can help to address a remarkable gap in feminist philosophy 
of the body, which has tackled a multitude of bodily phenomena (maternity, aging, bodily 
comportment), but has said virtually nothing about the bodily phenomenon of voice.1 
The philosophical implications of Linklater’s approach to vocal practice have been 
explored by phenomenologists, philosophers of mind, and others (McCance 2011). However, 
despite Linklater’s clear commitment to empowering female voices, there has been no 
examination of the potential resonances and tensions between Linklater’s work and the field of 
feminist philosophy.2 It is our position that contemporary feminist philosophers of the body hold 
particular promise as interlocutors with Linklater’s approach to vocal practice. While 
summarizing such a large and diverse field is beyond the scope of a single article, we present a 
few central ideas that we hope to be particularly useful.3  
         We begin by engaging with Linklater’s highly influential work Freeing the Natural Voice 
(Linklater 1976, 2006) and the significant advancements it represented in the field of voice. We 
proceed to a brief description of the field of contemporary feminist theories of the body, 
highlighting those insights and developments that either resonate most clearly with Linklater’s 
work or represent promising avenues for the next evolution of voice training. We then argue that 
such evolution should take up more directly the relationality of the voice (“intervocality”), an 
understanding of the body as ineluctably embedded within social and political dynamics, and a 
recognition of the profound influence of structural inequality on both vocality and vocal training. 
We conclude by gesturing toward a model of vocal generosity that may provide a framework for 
that next evolution. 
Linklater and Freeing the Natural Voice 
Linklater’s Freeing the Natural Voice (FNV) is one of the most important and referenced 
methodologies for training the voice. Her approach is highly utilized in rigorous actor training 
programs and workshops across the world for people interested in unshackling the voice from the 
hold of unconscious habitual patterns and psycho-physical tensions.4 
Linklater studied under Iris Warren at London Academy of Music and Dramatic Arts, 
from whom she learned an architecture of voice exercises for actors underpinned by 
psychological and physiological understandings of the voice. First published in 1976, FNV 
documents Linklater’s further development of Warren’s exercises, and constitutes the first 
comprehensive communication of the work in written form. A radical divergence from the more 
formal methods of the time, it has since become a leading textbook for voice in the field. 
It is important to acknowledge that FNV–as a methodology, as well as a text–emerged 
from a particular socio-political-cultural context which brought with it particular notions of both 
freedom and the natural connected to the cultural movements of the 1960s and early 1970s in the 
US and Britain. To this end we will a paint a general picture of the period. Arthur Marwick 
(2011) writes the of the upheavals and shifts from this time, which included but were not limited 
to:  
“black civil rights; idealism, protest, and rebellion [...] the new feminism; gay liberation 
[...]; `the counter-culture'” that could be set in contrast with some “key features of the 
fifties, including: rigid social hierarchy; subordination of women to men and children to 
parents; repressed attitudes to sex; unquestioning respect for authority in the family, 
education, government, the law, and religion [...] a strict formalism in language, etiquette, 
and dress codes, [etc.].” (10) 
Feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan describes the period as a “groundswell of opposition to the 
culture and psychology of militarism” wherein there was “a call for peace [...] joined by a call to 
free love” (Gilligan and Richards 2009, 258). Social ecologist Murray Bookchin identifies in the 
anti-authoritarianism of the revolutionary movements of this time “the ‘forms of freedom’ that 
can give direction to a liberatory future,” writing that “as nature achieves its highest self-
expression in a free human community in harmony with the rest of the natural world [...] nature 
finally becomes ‘free nature’” (De Leon 1994, 301).  A resurgence of Romanticism, carrying 
with it the promise of “allowing human beings to ‘feel at home’ in a meaningful, free and natural 
world,” (Gorodeisky 2016) unconstrained by the alienating and arbitrary powers of modernity, 
reached a critical height during this period, as a parallel mistrust of dominant institutions and 
government’s ability to protect personal freedoms was on the rise.  
The body itself emerges out of this period as a site of nostalgia, of a longing toward a 
time when bodies might have existed in a natural state, unconstrained by the rigidities of social 
norms and the invasive control of government and dominant mainstream culture. We can track 
this through the hippie movement’s rejection of convention, which produced an emphasis on 
self-presentation and the body through “new modes of self-presentation, involving emancipation 
from the old canons of fashion, and a rejoicing in the natural attributes of the human body” 
(Marwick 2011, 26). The anti-racist civil rights movement engendered a rejection of European 
standards of beauty and a reclaiming of untreated hair, thus equating a move toward the natural 
with empowerment, agency, and identity. Carol King wrote (and Aretha Franklin sang) “You 
make me feel like a natural woman,” and the uninhibited “cookbook” The Joy of Sex (1972), 
featuring realistically illustrated bodies, emphasized a reclaiming of the innocent, pre-lapsarian 
view on the body as natural. 
Of course, the invocations of nature did not go entirely unchallenged. The women's 
liberation movement in the late 1960s included voices that railed against the invocation of 
biology as a justification for inequality and demanded that women be given the freedom to 
control (rather than be determined by) their own bodies. In fact, Linklater’s work seems deeply 
influenced by both the call for a return to nature and the call for greater bodily freedom and 
autonomy. She advocates for the liberation and development of the (metaphorically and 
materially) suppressed and restricted voice, the voice that has gone into hiding, to restore a voice 
that can express one’s need and right to speak, a voice that is the authentic birthright of all 
human beings. Simultaneously psychological, political, physiological and philosophical, 
Linklater’s work championed the reclamation of voices that have been shamed or scared or 
socialized into hiding, as exemplified by her co-founding (with Carol Gilligan) the Company of 
Women, which provided voice training workshops for women and early adolescent girls 
(Rousuck 1996). 
The specific practical influences on Linklater voice work include discoveries about 
psychology, somatics, and the mechanics of the body that emerged from the early twentieth 
century, particularly the possibility of the re-education of the body through psycho-physical 
approaches such as Mabel Elsworth Todd’s somatic work (“ideokinesis”) and F.M. Alexander’s 
discoveries about the forces of habit and the possibility of exercising choice in the “Use” of self 
(Gelb 1996). In the 1960s and 1970s, as Linklater established herself as a teacher and coach in 
US theatre and conservatory voice training, she was influenced by experiments in mind-body 
work, including Moshe Feldenkrais’ method to improve body functioning through Awareness 
Through Movement as well as disciplines such as Rolfing, T’ai Chi, and Yoga. 
In the US theatre and training settings, Linklater’s work met American actors’ needs at a 
time when the psychological, emotional, physical, and stylistic demands on them required more 
than antiquated traditional methods emphasizing external skills (elocution, ballet, e.g.) could 
provide. The psychologically-based naturalistic acting style that emphasized the creative use of 
the inner self (in lieu of theatrical artifice) was finding many new iterations in the US at this 
time, and one could broadly trace its lineage to Konstantin Stanislavski who famously said, “all 
we ask is that an actor on the stage live in accordance with natural laws [...] to live as a natural 
human being” (Stanislavski 1949/1994, 288).  
In developing a vocal practice to strip artifice from the voice, Linklater provides a 
framework for its reconditioning that involves becoming conscious of and breaking habitual 
patterns largely internalized by socialization in the modern world–a world shaped, inevitably, by 
standards, technologies, politics, suppressions, both personal and social: “to free the voice is to 
free the person…the natural voice is most perceptibly blocked and distorted by physical tension; 
it suffers equally from emotional blocks, intellectual blocks, aural blocks, and psychological 
blocks” (Linklater 2006, 8). These blocks, largely in the form of secondary impulses that have 
become habits (either conscious or unconscious), are also the result of societal conditioning we 
receive:  
much human behavior is unconsciously controlled by habits conditioned in childhood by 
arbitrary influences, such as parents (or lack of them), teachers, peers,  [etc.] [… ] If we 
come to a point in our lives where we […] want to access the primitive sources of 
laughter, sorrow, anger, joy, we may find that the emotions themselves have been 
civilized or brutalized out of us. The nervous system impulses are blocked, rerouted, or 
crossed with countermanding impulses. (19-20) 
To this end, both published editions of Freeing the Natural Voice (a revised and 
expanded edition was released in 2006) articulate a series of practices aimed at liberating the 
voice of the subject: 
The natural voice has two to three octaves of speaking notes capable of 
expressing the full gamut of human emotions and all the subtleties and nuances of 
thought. To release its potential we most dissolve the limitations imposed by 
twentieth-century upbringing and awaken the dormant power that brings breath 
into every cell of the body and restores largesse of expression and stature to the 
human-actor-being. (Linklater 1992, 7) 
The effects of such limitations, claims Linklater, are significant: “tensions acquired through 
living in the world, and defenses, inhibitions and negative reactions to environment often 
diminish efficiency of natural voice to the point of distorted communication” (Linklater 2006, 7). 
Essential to the work of undoing those limitations is the “vital difference between what is 
‘natural’ and what is ‘familiar,’” connected to the objective of “a voice in direct contact with 
emotional impulse, shaped by intellect but not inhibited by it.”  She describes the natural voice as 
“transparent […] it reveals, not describes, inner impulses of emotion and thought, directly and 
spontaneously.” Importantly, “the person is heard, not the person’s voice.” The interfering 
processes and factors to vocal freedom are the limits of “desire, talent, imagination, or life 
experiences” (8). 
The later edition of FNV sustains the focus on these fundamental precepts and builds on 
them by adding an emphasis on the psycho-physical connections between imagery, sensation, 
and embodiment as well as a consideration of the receptive aspects of voice.  The importance of 
breath and the voice’s ability to receive shifts in imagery and thought both come to the fore, as 
well as the importance of relation: she describes a voice communicating the “inner world of the 
psyche to the outer world of attentive listeners” (8) through the emanations of sound, with some 
attention to the transmission of thought-feeling impulses to a listener through a sensing, alive 
body. “Invisible streams of energy” that is sound carry out to receptive bodies, bringing the 
speaker into the experience of being, paradoxically, two places at once – both onstage and in the 
auditorium (or with “the other”) at the same time (9). 
Elsewhere, Linklater (2010) writes of another important paradox in training for actors: 
that they must develop and train the voice to its potential in order “to forget about it, to sacrifice 
it—to let it be burned through by the heat of thoughts and feelings and moods and emotions.” It 
is not a matter of simply acquiring a skill, she writes: “Voice is identity. Your voice says, ‘I 
am.’” (43) Voice reveals not only the power and subtleties of shifting thought and feeling, but–
through a mutually perceived “ring of truth”–authentic selfhood. This does not necessarily imply, 
as philosopher Adriana Cavarero asserts, that the voice references an irreducible existent, a 
pointer to a unique identity (Cavarero 2005): but that the voice can transparently “reveal the truth 
about its owner” (Linklater 2006, 25)–not only who they are (i.e. recognition), but the content 
and quality of their experience in the moment. 
Beyond the need or desire to simply be heard, Linklater posits that the revelation of truth 
in performance (as in life) requires the voice to be plugged into the inner life of instinct and 
emotional impulses, so that it becomes the channel through which thought and feeling are 
accurately revealed. She describes a tension between the dualism of the raw materials of one’s 
inner life and a modern persona presented to the world: a Dionysian inner life (2018) ruled by 
sensual, sensory, and emotional aspects of human nature is contrasted with an outer expression 
often ruled by the Apollonian, the rational, ordered, self-disciplined, and often limiting aspects of 
experience that prevent the owner of the voice from being known (2006). She writes:  
'Per' and 'sona'—through sound. My voice is exquisitely conditioned to a multiplicity of 
social prevarications. The question is: can I choose to drop my mask, my persona, and let 
my voice pick up the living impulses of who I am and what I care about in my intrinsic 
identity[...] Whose voice am I speaking with? A teacher's voice or my own?” (Linklater 
2009b) 
Increasingly Linklater’s work has taken up current findings in neuroscience, particularly 
the ways in which the brain functions in speech (Damasio 1995, 1999).  Rejecting Descartes’s 
cogito ergo sum in favor of “I am, therefore, I think,” (Linklater 2010, 43), she asserts that the 
body, the senses, and the emotions are all “vital to the intelligence of the whole self.” In this 
spirit, Linklater seeks to reclaim the voice as a central site of the union of brain and body. 
Through the reconditioning of “the actors quartet” - voice, intellect, body, and emotion (2006),  
she looks to “reforge” the brain-body connection by navigating the interruptions and restrictions 
in the pathways through which they might connect, opening them up again, or creating new 
“expressways” through which thought, breath, and sound might travel. 
Linklater’s work is deeply rooted in the body, training the subject to identify and release 
specific tensions, develop an increased awareness of the felt-sensations of sound, and concentrate 
on the subtleties of causal thinking and powerful imagery that can lead to new freedoms of the 
voice, body, emotion and psyche. The work requires the subject to navigate through (not around) 
the resistances of habit in order to develop more possibilities, shifts, sensations, and releases of 
stored-up energies; it rejects a manipulative, muscular, and/or mechanical approach in favor of 
stimulating involuntary processes unimpeded by voluntary controls.  It fundamentally shifts the 
experience of sound from the ear of the subject–who in earlier, more traditional methods may be 
listening to the quality of their sound in relationship to some prescribed aesthetic standard–to a 
felt-sensation of sound as energy moving in the body, wherein the pitch of sound becomes, in a 
very real sense, “frequency of thought.” The radical notion that the voice does not simply live in 
the larynx–an instrument waiting to be “played by” the self–and that it is the very embodiment of 
self, connecting body, imagination, and emotion, is one of Linklater’s most groundbreaking 
ideas. The approach also asks the subject to move the guiding “brain” of the self from the head 
down to the body: in particular to the solar-plexus–as a transmitting and receiving nerve center 
that governs the diaphragm and breathing and connects to the experience of feelings. This 
privileging of impulses from the “gut brain” (or “second brain”) over the “tyranny of the 
analytical brain” is a key premise in the work. Finally, the series of exercises itself is meticulous, 
deep, detailed, and requires a substantial commitment of time and attention, well beyond the 
requirements of many prior approaches to voice whose focus might have been more on the 
production of certain desirable sounds. Linklater’s approach asks the subject to live in the 
moment-to-moment “means-whereby” (to borrow a phrase from Alexander Technique) the act of 
voicing occurs, thus rendering the voice work as a progression rather than a “technique.”  At one 
author’s Designation Workshop in 2007, Linklater described the work of the voice through a 
geopolitical model: after freeing the “nation-state” of the voice from tyranny, it is not enough to 
leave it free but weak; it requires development and strengthening, increased capacity, flexibility, 
range, and nuance, and the facility to allow clear thought to translate ultimately into clear, fully-
felt and embodied speech. 
Contemporary Feminist Philosophies of the Body 
From Mary Wollstonecraft’s critique (1792/2004) of the patriarchal tyranny that imposed bodily 
weakness on women to Iris Marion Young’s description (2005) of the social and political norms 
inscribed on the bodily habits of women, feminist philosophers have consistently focused on the 
body. This focus responds to (at least) two related insights: that dominant strains of Western 
philosophy have denigrated the philosophical relevance of the body while upholding male 
supremacy; and that the oppression of a wide spectrum of intersecting marginalized groups 
targeted (and constructed) specific bodies, forms of embodiment, and embodied norms. Feminist 
philosophy aims to develop insightful accounts of the structures of systemic inequality, which 
includes interrogating how bodies are conceptualized, shaped, experienced, and perceived. In 
this section, we focus primarily on feminist theories of embodiment that have been developed 
from the mid-twentieth century to the present, although some of the themes discussed were 
present even before this time period. Although similar ideas have been explored in a variety of 
feminist disciplines and practices, we are highlighting here the arguments developed by those 
using explicitly philosophical methodologies and approaches. Moreover, rather than attempting a 
comprehensive summary of this wide-ranging field of scholarship, we center our discussion on 
those aspects that are particularly promising for engaging critically with Linklater’s approach to 
vocal practice. 
         An obvious point of resonance between contemporary feminist theories of the body and 
Linklater’s approach to vocal practice lies in their mutual rejection of a Western philosophical 
tradition that privileges ostensibly disembodied phenomena – the soul, the mind, thinking, 
objectivity, etc. – over phenomena associated with bodies (and bodies themselves). 
Contemporary feminist philosophers of the body generally agree that such dualism is not only 
philosophically dubious, but also damaging insofar as it perpetuates various forms of inequality 
(Grosz 1994; Gatens 1996; Bordo 1993). By associating the body with inferiority, and certain 
social groups (women, people of color, disabled people) with the body, dualistic philosophical 
theories participate in the social and political marginalization of those groups. 
         Some feminist philosophers, unsurprisingly, respond by insisting that women are no more 
or less associated with the body than men. Wollstonecraft, for example, argues that sexist 
philosophical theories and political structures take for granted that the genders are fundamentally 
different, and that women are therefore not eligible for the rights and responsibilities extended to 
men. She recommends the obvious remedy: stop treating women as if they were weak and 
intellectually bereft, afford them access to all the goods provided to men, and allow their natural 
intellectual capacities to flourish. For the most part, however, contemporary feminist 
philosophers have responded to the tradition of dualism by rejecting it and establishing the body 
as philosophically and existentially significant. Rather than understanding matters of 
embodiment as regrettable facts of life that impede the progress of higher capacities or values, 
contemporary feminist theorists explore embodiment as a necessary element of human existence 
replete with philosophical, social, and political meaning. In so doing, we are arguing here that 
they develop conceptual tools well-suited to analyzing the embodied phenomenon of voice. 
         Related to the rejection of dualism is a theme that might provide possibilities for tension 
with Linklater’s approach: a repudiation of both naturalism and the epistemological primacy of 
science. Feminist philosophers of the body tend to view with a high degree of skepticism any 
claims about the “natural,” or prepolitical body (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Haraway 1991). 
References to what bodies are, or could be, absent the effects of social and cultural forces are 
suspect insofar as they deny the fact that no human body can come into existence without 
extensive social and political infrastructure. Adopting a nature/culture dichotomy in order to 
isolate what is “real” about the body (i.e., natural) from what is “artificial” (i.e., cultural) is to 
adopt a dualism as questionable and problematic as the mind/body divide (Grosz 2008). That 
such dualism can sometimes be marshalled to strategically counter pernicious effects of social 
structures isn’t enough to redeem it, from a feminist perspective, given the ways in which 
references to the realm of nature have so often been marshalled to justify inequality. 
The feminist rejection of scientism runs along similar lines but focuses more on the social 
and political nature of knowledge production. While contemporary feminist philosophers 
certainly don’t reject the value of scientific knowledge about the biological body in certain 
contexts, they do reject the assumption that such knowledge is necessarily more objective, 
reliable, and comprehensive than other forms of knowledge. Feminists epistemologists challenge 
the claim that scientific knowledge can be generated in a way that transcends its social, political, 
and historical context (Bleir 1984; Harding 1991; Tuana 2010), and note that the promise of 
apolitical, objective, value-neutral knowledge that grounds Western scientific methodologies is 
itself socially produced. Knowledge about the biological body generated by scientific discourses 
is thus seen as one kind of knowledge among many; it is frequently useful, but not by definition 
superior to knowledge gained in other ways. 
This rejection of scientism is central to feminist phenomenology, a subfield marked by an 
attention to the lived body – the body as experienced by the living human subject, as opposed to 
the body-as-object studied by traditional Western forms of science – and the ways in which that 
lived body experiences the world in which it is embedded. While original forms of 
phenomenology (Husserl [1913/1963], Merleau-Ponty [1945/2012]) sought to reveal structures 
of lived experience universal to human beings, feminist phenomenologists criticized those 
allegedly gender-neutral descriptions for harboring sexist assumptions (Bartky 1990, Weiss 
1999). Iris Marion Young (2005) described, for example, how gendered norms became 
instantiated in feminine bodily comportment, thus demonstrating that that Merleau-Ponty’s 
description of the material world as open and welcoming to the projects of the embodied human 
being fails to account for the construction of female-identified bodies as inherently incapable. 
While phenomenology in its classical form was positioned as an epistemological challenge to 
scientism, and not a political challenge to structural inequality, feminist phenomenology has the 
explicit aim of articulating how bodily ways of being are implicated in sexism, racism, and other 
forms of inequality. Feminist phenomenology, then, can help us to understand both how the 
material phenomenon of voice is experienced by the vocal subject, and how that phenomenon is 
shaped by social forces while remaining ineluctably embodied and material. 
         Indeed, it is crucial to recognize that the feminist rejection of naturalism and scientism, 
whether articulated by epistemologists or phenomenologists, does not constitute a rejection of 
the philosophical relevance of the materiality of the body (that is, the fact that the body is made 
up of matter, stuff). In fact, rejecting dualism frequently results in an emphasis on the social and 
ethical importance of the fact that bodies are material entities. How to conceptualize and 
understand the materiality of the body, however, remains an ongoing challenge, exemplified 
acutely by the disagreement between Luce Irigaray (1985, 1993) and Judith Butler (1990, 1993). 
Irigaray argues that the patriarchal obsession with the one, the unitary, and the universal has 
denied the untranscendable multiplicity found in the materiality of human bodies, while Butler 
argues that materiality, constructed as an unconstructed ground of knowledge, has played both a 
conceptual role in masking the constructed nature of the categories of sex and gender and a 
practical role in the production of sexed and gendered identities. As fundamental as the 
philosophical differences between these two thinkers are, their theories demonstrate the 
centrality of materiality to the field of contemporary feminist theories of the body. More 
recently, some feminist philosophers have suggested that the materiality explored by thinkers 
such as Irigaray and Butler is not even quite material enough; that is, such approaches do not 
sufficiently engage with the stuff of life, matter itself, but regress into a privileging of ideology 
or structure that remains essentially disembodied. Feminist contributions to the emerging school 
of thought termed “new materialism,” for example, have sometimes moved away from the 
existentialist and phenomenological frameworks that can be found in Butler and/or Irigaray, in 
favor of a reanimation of the questions emerging from the traditional sciences (Grosz 2010), or 
have recast the social project of citizenship around a materialist understanding of life itself 
(Braidotti 2010). 
Another hallmark (albeit a contested one) of contemporary feminist theories of the body 
is the conceptual framework of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991; Carastathis 2013; Collins and 
Bilge 2016), which illuminates how different forms of structural inequality are implicated in 
each other. Intersectional theorists point out that sexism takes substantially different forms 
depending on one’s racial identity; for example, the focus on reproductive rights that marked the 
1970s US women’s movement (and/or its representation; see Silliman et al 2016) tended to focus 
on the right to prevent and terminate pregnancies, rights that were of particular interest to white, 
upper-class women. Critiques from women of color argued that focusing on such individual 
rights ignored the political interests of women of color (Roberts 1997), including protection from 
forced sterilization (Thomason 2013), safe and just environments within which to raise children, 
and effective prenatal care. By assuming that sexism primarily took the form of enforcing 
procreation on women, the movement failed to notice the ways in which sexism was raced, and 
thus mistakenly, and oppressively, represented the interests of white women as the interests of 
women per se. Similar patterns are found at different intersections: racism is sexed, just as 
sexism is raced; ableism takes different forms in different socioeconomic contexts; and one’s 
race can have a significant impact on the social and political meanings of one’s physical or 
cognitive impairment (Ben-Moshe and Magaña 2014). Exploring vocal (in)justice, then, will 
require a sustained focus on intersectional axes of oppression. 
Together, the rejection of the natural body together and the recognition of 
intersectionality result in a focus on bodily multiplicity–a point that will be foundational in our 
approach to vocal (in)justice. While embodiment is a characteristic shared by all human beings, 
different bodies are influenced and shaped by different potent and intersecting social forces. By 
privileging certain kinds of bodies – white, able-bodied, male, heterosexual, and so on – to the 
exclusion of others, philosophical traditions have not only perpetuated injustice and unnecessary 
suffering: they have also committed a category mistake of the highest order. Contemporary 
feminist philosophies of the body insist that living up to the promise of exploring humanity itself 
(a promise, we note, that both Western philosophy and Western theatre make) necessitates 
refocusing our attention toward the queer, disabled, economically underserved, racialized, 
sexualized, undocumented bodies, not as aberrations or exceptions to the rule, but as specific 
incarnations of the scope of human embodied possibilities. 
Understanding embodiment in this way immediately raises questions about how to 
understand the individual body and its relation to social and political forces that shape, 
contextualize, and enable it. Given the profound influence of these forces, including systematic 
inequality, on bodily understandings, capacities, and forms, how are we to understand 
possibilities of resistance? How are we to conceptualize our experiences of the uniqueness of 
human beings, the fact that even in their relationality, individual human beings have distinct 
thoughts, perceptions, and modes of being? Does the profound influence of the social and 
political environment within which a body develops eradicate the possibility and value of 
autonomy? 
Different thinkers have addressed these questions in different ways, and there is nothing 
close to a consensus on these matters. For the purposes of our discussion, however, it may be 
helpful to move forward with an understanding of uniqueness and individuality as existential 
location, as opposed to a more familiar Western view of uniqueness as an internal, disembodied 
essence. In other words, what distinguishes different individual human beings from each other is 
not the nature of their own essential self – almost always framed as an other-than-material 
interiority, walled off from social influences, a “who” one is – but rather the fact that they are 
situated, in a bodily and material way, at an intersection of a multiplicity of forces that coalesce 
in a way that cannot be reproduced with complete verisimilitude for any other human being. We 
are naming this intersection as one’s existential location, a term that emphasizes the “that-ness” 
of an individual’s being–that they exist and act from a specific social position–as opposed to the 
“who-ness” of an ostensibly internal essence. However, readers should not associate such “that-
ness” with mere materiality or objecthood as usually conceptualized within a Western 
metaphysics; while the notion of existential location is certainly grounded in a recognition of the 
role of embodiment, and specific bodily limitations and parameters, in identity, it rejects the 
association of materiality with passivity, inertness, or a deficiency of agency. While the 
coalescence of those forces is fine-grained enough to ensure that one’s existential location could 
never be fully inhabited by another, other embodied beings are also being shaped and situated by 
those same forces, and so commonalities of experience are not only possible but certain. And 
even the uniqueness of location is irrevocably relational; I cannot understand the particularity of 
my situatedness without reference to other beings, as well as social and political structures. 
However, this model of location cannot be endowed with a sense of static or constant 
nature. Embodied subjects are capable of both literal and existential movement, but such 
movement should be understood as having the potential for existential transformation as well. 
Developing different forms of relations can result in shifts in identity, transformations, new 
modes of being, and so on. Moreover, how these possibilities of mobility (both physical and 
existential) are lived need to be again framed by the relevance of social and political forces. 
María Lugones’ (1987), notion of world-traveling has been central in developing philosophical 
accounts of embodiment in a context of racial and sexual inequality, and is particularly apt for 
our purposes here. 
         Lugones’ description of world-traveling is grounded in an expansive, dynamic 
understanding of what constitutes a world, an understanding, she emphasizes, that does not lend 
itself to a fixed, static definition (1987, 9). For Lugones, worlds are complex sites of meaning-
making, replete with embodied individuals, physical infrastructure, historical meaning, and so 
on. As specific social, political, and material contexts, worlds include terms, patterns, and habits 
that may or may not transfer coherently to other worlds. Worlds construct subjective beings 
(sometimes without their awareness or knowledge), and the experience of traveling between 
worlds is, for individuals who find themselves “outside of the mainstream of, for example, the 
U.S. dominant construction or organization of life...a matter of necessity and survival” (11). 
Lugones insists that, due to the subject-constructing aspects of worlds, “travel” is not to be 
understood as the shifting between spaces of an individual being, but as the shifting of identity 
itself (11-12). 
As Mariana Ortega (2016) points out, Lugones later described the shifting of identity 
required by world-traveling as “ontological pluralism” (Lugones 2003) to clarify how the world 
traveler animated different subjectivities in the movement between and among worlds. Ortega is, 
however, unconvinced by this model of ontological pluralism (for example, she notes that the 
traveling self can remember the different worlds they have inhabited, evidence that there is some 
form of persistent “I” that survives across different worlds). She suggests replacing Lugones’ 
ontological pluralism with an existential pluralism, which entails understanding individual selves 
as multiplicitous, capable of and open to a wide variety of existential modalities (2016, 98). It is 
crucial to note, however, that both Lugones and Ortega reject a notion of the unified, self-
contained, decontextualized self as a “fiction trying to maintain itself by way of the logic of 
purity and as an exercise in domination” (103).   
Understanding existential uniqueness as location raises as many questions as it answers, 
as the disagreement between Lugones and Ortega indicates. For the purposes of our discussion, 
however, it may serve as a way of thinking of the embodied self that emphasizes the inescapable, 
existential relevance of an individual’s social, political, historical, etc., situation, while 
simultaneously recognizing that such embeddedness does not amount to either existential 
fungibility (one similarly situated person is not existentially or ontologically identical to another) 
or a nightmare of determinism. 
In terms of thinking about the phenomenon of human voice, such a model affords us a 
way of thinking of the individual voice as multiple, embedded in and emanating from social and 
political contexts, and yet animating an existential uniqueness. To sum up: contemporary 
feminist theories of the body provide the conceptual tools to understand vocal particularity 
without: (1) understanding social categories or the process of socialization as necessarily 
contrary to that particularity; (2) underestimating or ignoring the crucial influence of structural 
inequality; or (3) referring to a “natural” voice, untouched by such socialization. 
The Next Evolution: Toward an Ethical Ideal of Vocal Generosity 
Our exploration of contemporary feminist philosophies of the body has helped us to develop 
several insights that we hope will contribute to the continuing evolution of vocal training. In this 
section, we address more directly and in more detail, both the complex relationship between the 
individual vocal practitioner and the social and political contexts within which that practitioner is 
embedded and the relationship between structural forms of inequality and identity. 
         With regard to the first point, we are struck by the strong focus on the individual 
practitioner in Linklater’s approach, as well as the focus on socialization primarily as a 
repressive, controlling force. Together, these points of emphasis construct a model of freedom 
defined by an individual undoing of oppressive social norms and habits, a model that limits the 
scope of ethical analysis and rests on assumptions that now, given our engagement with the 
philosophical material summarized above, seem untenable. 
We find ourselves wary of the claim that a natural, authentic, voice–however multi-
faceted, flexible, and varied–exists underneath the accumulated effects of socialization, awaiting 
liberation. Such a claim implies that social forces are contrary to the existence or emergence of 
an authentic, truly expressive self, and that authentic selves somehow exist both prior to and in 
spite of effects of socialization. Social forces don’t act on authentic selves as much as they create 
the conditions of possibility under which selves emerge in their particularity; in other words, 
both specific selves and social groups are constituted by complex interactions of social, material, 
and political forces. This is not to say that any one individual, or a particular social group, is 
entirely determined by such forces, or that such forces are impervious to the influence of human 
individuals or groups. But it is to say that it is impossible to understand a human self in isolation 
from social and political forces, and that to pit authenticity against socialization is questionable 
at best. 
Foucault’s theory of power, particularly as articulated in his earlier works (1973, 1977), 
substantially influences our approach. With regard to structural inequality, power has often been 
understood as an essentially repressive force, one that limits the capacities and opportunities of 
members of marginalized groups. When understood in this way, liberatory strategies focus on the 
eradication of power dynamics, or the undoing of their pernicious effects. There is no doubt that 
viewing power in this way can illuminate important ethical wrongs, but Foucault’s articulation of 
disciplinary power (1977) reminds us that power also works in a productive mode, by 
disciplining bodies in ways that create subjective capacities, skills, and desires. From this 
perspective, power takes the material body as its target as well as its mechanism, inculcating in 
muscles, capillaries, and nervous systems norms that align with systemic and structural 
inequalities. And so bodies disciplined in femininity do not have to remind themselves to sit in 
ways that take up small amounts of space, or to feel shame about menstruation and its effects. 
Instead, those disciplined bodies have developed habits and preferences such that those 
experiences are both seemingly natural and sometimes delightful, or at least welcome. To do the 
opposite – to proudly announce that one’s period has begun, or to take up as much space as 
possible on a subway seat – would make one feel not only awkward, but less than oneself. 
Foucault’s productive model of power does not deny its damaging influence–biopower functions 
to create the kinds of embodied subjects that keep the machinery of inequality moving more or 
less smoothly–but it does emphasize that power produces selves, rather than limiting or 
repressing them. Although Foucault is clear that power can be resisted, and that new habits can 
be adopted, and thus new subjectivities developed, it is not the case that power distorts an 
authentic or natural self. 
 Annette Schlichter (2014) adopts a poststructuralist approach to Linklater’s work, 
influenced significantly by the later Foucault; although she ultimately argues that the embodied 
practice of Linklater’s approach ends up undermining “its own ideology of the authentic self,” 
she shares our concern regarding the invocation of the natural voice:   
voice work might exemplify exactly what can go wrong with a humanist understanding 
of voice and its utilization in the neoliberal marketplace, be it the resonances of 
phonocentrism in the identification of voice and self, or the problem of a pedagogy that, 
unaware of its own disciplinary function, promises liberation through authentic vocality. 
The function of a natural voice as a new form of cultural capital in the current 
marketplace of techniques of self-improvement might raise even more eyebrows (para. 
4).  
 
We remain somewhat unconvinced by Schlichter’s argument that the invocations of the 
natural voice can be readily and clearly separated from the specifics of the Linklater approach, its 
effects, and how those effects are both experienced and conceptualized by its practitioners. 
Perhaps more to our point here, however, is the need to recognize that the disciplinary effects of 
vocal acculturation render vocal habits more existentially salient than Linklater’s written work, 
at least, recognizes. The process of undoing unwanted bodily habits and ways of being, even if 
the results of such a process are ultimately valued, is more complicated than the straightforward 
language of liberation implies, and it may involve experiences of existential loss. To transform 
vocal habits, particularly in an intentional, more or less profound fashion, is to call into question 
established modes of being and acting, and thus has the potential (again, to a greater or lesser 
degree, depending on context) to unsettle one’s sense of identity, including one’s relationships 
with individual others and communities–relationships that may well be central to a sense of self 
that is highly valued. In practice, Linklater’s approach indeed acknowledges that the unconscious 
grip of habits formed can be rooted back to a social, emotional, or bodily need: such habits 
simply would not exist if at one time they did not serve the speaker. Freeing the voice from these 
habits is understood as the letting go of ways of being that have been neither superficial nor 
without value to those undertaking the process, but which have outlived their usefulness. 
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However, it is the arena of the freed and released voice, itself constituted by more desirable and 
conscious use, that demands particular attention as an existential site produced and shaped by 
many competing disciplinary forces. 
Conceptualizing the individual as necessarily embedded in, inseparable from, and 
constituted by social and political forces is a crucial aspect of exploring anew the relationship 
between identity and structural inequalities. The assumption that the real, authentic self is 
constituted prior to forces of socialization encourages the belief that structural inequalities such 
as racism and sexism primarily serve to undermine the possibilities of and for authentic selves. It 
can also contribute to the assumption that the authentic self is unmarked by the very identity 
factors that such systematic inequalities rely on–and so the real self may be assumed to be not 
raced, not sexed, not defined by physical ability, and so on. Thinking with Linda Martín Alcoff 
(2005), however, we hold that social identities inextricably linked with systematic inequalities 
are nevertheless not reducible to them and are replete with existential meaning and value. Vocal 
ways of being serve to ground a person in a specific community, particularly if that community 
is politically marginalized, and therefore have both existential and political importance. Indeed, 
they may be worth protecting rather than discarding. 
One of the central insights that we are taking from contemporary feminist philosophies of 
the body is the primacy of relations as opposed to the primacy of individual selves. We find 
convincing the claims that both the sheer existence of individual human beings and the particular 
identity and ways of being that an individual human being may instantiate are grounded 
necessarily in relation to others. Humans do not exist as much as they exist-with, and the 
tendency of Western philosophical theories to undervalue or ignore relationality aligns closely 
with the rejection of the body and the marginalization of women, people of color, disabled 
persons, and many others. 
Understanding relationality as prior to individuality does not amount to a denial of the 
uniqueness of individual persons. Rather, it entails recognizing that uniqueness always emerges 
from and is located within an untranscendable, inescapable field of relationality. And if this is so, 
then engaging with the ongoing development of a person’s vocal capacity is a process embedded 
in a complex network of social relations, political forces, and historical specificity. Cognizant of 
a long history in both philosophy and theatre in which Western cultural practices and norms were 
falsely represented as universally and ideally human, we seek to highlight the ethical 
responsibilities inherent in the relationality of vocal training. In particular, we seek to explore 
how even calls for vocal liberation can unwittingly reinscribe patterns of inequality, particularly 
if those calls rely on models of the autonomous, independent self. 
In terms of voice training, we are particularly suspicious of the recurring call–largely in 
mainstream television and radio, online and print journals, and the blogosphere,5 as well as in 
some theatre training and performance practices–for female or queer-identified voices to 
abandon vocal fry, uptalk, and other vocal habits that (so the story goes) undermine the speaker’s 
capacity to command respect.6 Women in particular are encouraged to reject ways of speaking 
that have been part of their socialization as women “in a man’s world” (Linklater 2006, 25) and 
to reclaim a stronger sense of their vocal self, with the promise that doing so will amount to 
being taken more seriously–with no attention paid to the possibility that losing a palpable 
expression of their gender identity might involve significant loss. Such exhortations not only 
reify the social and political desirability of the recognizably masculine “big and strong” voice; 
they also assume that the social meanings of vocal qualities are separable from the bodies from 
which they emanate, as if it were the bare, disembodied vocal qualities that generate the desired 
effects. We suspect that the tendency to respond with respect to certain vocal qualities is a more 
complicated matter, one involving those vocal qualities and their relation to certain gendered 
forms of embodiment and a patriarchal social context. That is, distortions in communication here 
may be as much a function of “the hearer’s own hopes, fears, and ideological inclinations” as 
anything else (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2013, 105). To have women simply adopt masculine 
ways of speaking is no more likely to garner respect than a female politician’s pantsuit. Even 
more acutely, we are concerned that such exhortations upholds a social and political tradition of 
viewing women’s bodies–and therefore voices–as more appropriately open to critique, policing, 
and judgment. 
What might the next evolution in vocal training look like, then? What would it mean to 
retain the many advances made by Linklater’s approach–including its admirable emphasis on the 
materiality of the embodied voice, the recognition of the existential importance of the embodied 
voice, and the possibility of vocal transformation that enhances one’s sense of self and ability to 
communicate with others–while simultaneously bringing to bear an emphasis on relationality and 
a deepened sense of the role of systematic injustice in the construction of identity? 
To begin, the focus on the liberation of the individual voice needs to be more clearly and 
persistently situated within (and perhaps even replaced by a focus on) the context of 
intervocality. Just as contemporary feminist theories of the body have emphasized the crucial 
ways in which bodies are shaped, influenced, and ineluctably marked by social and political 
factors, so too does the embodied phenomenon of the human voice emerge within and from a 
complex set of relations and power dynamics, including the persistent perpetuation of systematic 
inequalities. Voice work must thus be understood as both occurring within the current context of 
those inequalities – not separate from or untainted by their influence – and as heir to multiple 
intellectual and professional traditions inescapably affiliated with sexism, racism, transphobia, 
colonialism, ableism, and so on. 
Quite aside from the question of the existence of the natural voice, understanding voice 
work as situated within systems of structural inequality also raises the question of the unequal 
distribution of the risks of challenging vocal norms among different social groups; members of 
dominant groups may well have access to more vocal freedom than members of marginalized 
groups, and much less to lose by enacting wider scopes of vocal practice. In addition, members 
of marginalized groups may have existentially and politically meaningful attachments to vocal 
patterns and habits that, while surely socially constructed, nevertheless ground them in beloved 
communities and serve to create vocal sites of political and social resistance to injustice. The 
relational construction of voices inside the spectrum of gender and sexuality can result in, for 
example, trans voices that serve as markers of political meaning, social identity, and personal 
authenticity whilst also deeply connecting to the concepts of liberation, agency and/or resistance. 
Clearly, an ethics of vocal libertarianism – a kind of “you do you” approach to vocal 
work – will be entirely insufficient to the task of interrogating intervocality. Such an approach 
minimizes the centrality of relationality in vocal identity, as well as the complex ways in which 
systemic injustices have shaped vocal and aural practices, habits, and norms. Here we seek to 
push back on such vocal libertarianism by understanding voice(s) as ontologically intervocal, 
such that vocal identity is understood as one of many corporeal sites of the creation and 
production of various selves-in-relation to other spaces, forces, and (speaking/listening) selves. 
Our voices are both resolutely ours (often immediately recognizable as belonging to a specific 
individual, as Cavarero [2005] points out) and ineluctably marked and beholden to the other (a 
factor that Cavarero’s analysis omits). How and what we can sound out through our bodily 
cavities and bones and the air we swim in is shaped by the architecture we have inhabited, the 
particulate matter held by that air, the other vocal and aural beings we have encountered, the 
ways in which our sounds have been received and categorized and judged – and the ways in 
which we have received, categorized, and judged the vocalizations of others. And our voices do 
not merely externalize interior reality; as part of our embodied being, they are part and parcel of 
our ongoing material becoming, bringing into being new sensations, new possibilities, new ways 
of understanding and living. 
What is needed is an ethical framework that values a multiplicity of vocal patterns and 
possibilities, pushes back against the ways in which vocal capacities are marshalled to reify and 
perpetuate various forms of systematic injustice, situates human voices as irreducibly emerging 
from a complex set of social and political relations, and conceptualizes the material, embodied 
phenomenon that is human-generated sound as replete with both existential and political 
meaning. We would like to offer as an opening gesture in developing such an ethical framework 
the concept of vocal generosity. 
Here, we take as our starting point Rosalyn DiProse’s notion of corporeal generosity 
(2002), which emphasizes that all human beings, precisely by virtue of their necessary 
embodiment, are always and already marked by corporal gifts. The giving and receiving of 
breath and blood are not the results of human freedom and agency, but their building blocks, and 
so the ontology of the human being is revealed as grounded in a state of untranscendable 
indebtedness. Establishing corporeal generosity as an ontological fact about embodied human 
beings, however, does not amount to an ethical mandate requiring any and all corporeal gifts; as 
embodied subjects develop in a context of intercorporeality, they develop both capacities and 
preferences for specific corporeal gifts. Injustice, DiProse says, frequently takes the form of 
forcing the gift (compelling women to carry unwanted pregnancies, for example), as well as 
memorializing certain corporeal gifts while ignoring others. 
Transferring DiProse’s concept of corporeal generosity to the vocal realm would involve 
the recognition that vocal human beings only develop in a context of vocal and aural gift-giving 
and cannot be isolated from the vocal and aural gifts they have received and given. It could also 
ground a political and ethical analysis of which vocal and aural gifts have been marked as 
valuable, and which have been ignored. In addition, it provides a helpful model for 
understanding the complex intersection between the universal and the particular: while all voices 
have been engaged, by definition, in the exchange of vocal and aural gifts, the specific gifts they 
have received and given are necessarily particular. The richly sonorous in utero soundscape is 
always marked by particular vowels, consonants, rhythms, tones, and volumes; while each 
inhabitant of the womb hears and feels the sounds of heartbeats and rushing blood, even these 
sounds are shaped by the bodily habits and practices of the maternal body, which are in turn 
shaped by a social and political environment. 
Vocal generosity, then, highlights the irreducible relationality of the voice, thus bringing 
to the fore the existential relevance of the in-betweenness of vocal relations: the voice is never 
merely an emanation, but always emerges in a social environment involving multiple vocal 
subjects who serve as both vocalizers and receivers. It also allows us to understand how vocal 
norms have intersected with structural inequalities to privilege certain vocal gifts (the 
development, say, of tones and rhythms associated with great oratory) while ignoring or vilifying 
others (constructing certain kinds of voices as deficient and in need of correction, say, or 
neglecting the role of maternal vocalizations in brain development, both before and after birth). 
The framework of vocal generosity also generates new questions for the field of voice work, 
such as: how do the vocal gifts that have been engaged in the generation of certain kinds of 
voices affect what kinds of vocal gifts those voices are able or willing to give to others? 
We also want to extend our understanding of vocal generosity in ways that go well 
beyond DiProse’s concept of corporeal generosity. Acutely aware of the ways in which structural 
inequalities have served to funnel broad vocal capacities into overly narrow categories of vocal 
identity, we seek to use the idea of vocal generosity as a call for the development not only of a 
multitude of vocal patterns, styles, tones, etc., but for a deepened ability to receive that 
multiplicity in more consistently generous, open, and just ways. We are aware, for example, of 
the ways in which trans persons are punished for not adopting vocal patterns and habits that align 
with the sex they were assigned at birth or the gender binary in general; and of the ways in which 
voices that are marked by various forms of disability are disregarded, met with impatience, and 
socially marginalized; and of the ways in which white supremacy employs the politics and 
spatiality of sound to justify brutal acts of violence against bodies of color.  A model of vocal 
generosity could frame these forms of vocal injustice as examples of failing to recognize and 
receive certain forms of vocal gifts, a failure which not only harms and marginalizes certain 
individuals, but it impoverishes our common understanding of the wide spectrum of vocal 
possibilities. That failure also, insofar as it establishes certain voices as acceptable/normal/ideal–
as if they become so without complex practices of vocal recognition and nurturing–serves to 
mask human intervocality. In this way, the framework of vocal generosity both clarifies the 
harms of vocal injustice as imposed particularly on members of marginalized groups and 
identifies how such harms have a cumulatively negative effect on general understandings of the 
phenomenon of human intervocality. 
Conclusion 
As we look toward developing a new framework for vocal liberation and development– 
embracing the notions of intervocality and vocal generosity–we return to an awareness of breath, 
which Linklater describes as the “prima materia” (Linklater 2009a, 101): the foundational 
material of the voice is air itself. Luce Irigaray argues that Western metaphysics is overly 
“founded in the solid” (Irigaray 1999, 25), and calls for “the cultivation of breath as a way to 
conceive of the relationality of individuation and community, and sexual difference beyond 
logocentrism and patriarchy” (Górska 2016, 25 and Irigaray 1999). Breath lives in the in-
between, at the places where margins are created and destroyed: that which is around the body 
moves into the body, merges and melds with the body, and is released from the body, carrying 
with it material from the body. It is both me and not-me. Linklater asserts that freedom of the 
breath has everything to do with “dissolving protective habits in the mind and the body” 
(Linklater 2009a, 104). Breath also dissolves the clearly demarcated borders of where bodies end 
and other spaces begin, as it “opens the horizon of what it means to be a human breathing subject 
beyond conventional boundaries of human embodiment” (Górska 2016, 43). This exchange is 
always political in nature: the air I breathe in (as well as the breath in my body) is contained, 
moved, framed by the architecture of resonant, constructed spaces (public, private, outdoors, 
indoors), and always marked by a multiplicity of meanings and disciplinary forces. My capacity 
to breathe, my right to breathe, and the quality of my breath are in a constant state of material 
becoming. My identity exists in relation to my surroundings, to the acoustic environment, 
wherein intelligibility and recognition and the possibilities for communication are continually re-
created. Magadelena Górska writes: 
breathing [...] can inspire diverse analyses of relational natural and cultural, material and 
social scapes that are oxygenated across diverse spaces, times, geopolitical relations, 
ecosystems [...] it becomes an enactment of movement and circulation within and across 
(human and nonhuman) bodies, spaces, species and culture. (30) 
         Linklater describes the breathing apparatus itself as an “image of a tapestry woven 
around the inner walls of the body” (Linklater 2009a, 107). She points out that “it can help to 
know that the root of the word ‘text’ (as in the text of a story) is the same as the root of the word 
‘tapestry’: both words originate in the Latin ‘tessere’ which means ‘to weave.’” She also 
suggests that “you can let the words (the stitches?) of your story be sewn into the fiber of your 
breathing and your voice will be filled with living pictures” (107). In this sense, Linklater here 
imagines the body and breath as textual and even in a sense, intertextual (Kristeva 1966/1986). 
The intertextuality of breath is then a site of production by many forces: the text (and texture) of 
our breathing is an interweaving and circulation of socio-cultural influences, images, material 
body, spaces, and shared air.  The currently emerging field of “respiratory philosophy” 
(Berndston 2010) demonstrates a growing interest in the cultivation of breathing as “the gesture 
that re-unites what philosophy has split apart” (Hawke 2015). If it is true that that various worlds 
construct specifically situated subjective beings, we then experience the world through breath, 
think with and according to breath (Berndston 2010). As we look to contemporary philosophy to 
re-situate our experience of the ongoing processes of breath as the primary existential site of the 
production of our various selves (we breathe, and are breathed, into being), we can also see how 
philosophy can indeed look to the practices of breath in Linklater voice work, wherein thought 
and breath are intimately linked; and “inspiration” need not continue to hold a double meaning 
(neither only “a movement of the intellect” nor “the drawing of air into the lungs,” but both) in 
consciously lived-out experience. 
To borrow from Górska: we call upon a moment of “respite” (2016) in which the reader 
is invited to take a breath, a respiratory instant between the specifically located reading of text on 
this page and the expansion into new meanings beyond its bounded, printed form–a moment to 
redirect our attention to all of the axes of understanding, to become aware, and to breathe 
differently: 
Allow the breath to enter...let the breath drop in [...] feed in a sigh impulse and then let it 
release out...open inside for the breath to come in—then let it escape... 





Alcoff, Linda Martín. 2006. Visible Identities, Race, Gender, and the Self. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Arana, Gabriel. 2013. “Creaky Voice: Yet Another Example of Young Women’s LInguistic 
Ingenuity.” The Atlantic. January 10. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/01/creaky-voice-yet-another-example-of-
young-womens-linguistic-ingenuity/267046/ 
Bartky, Sandra Lee. 1990. Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of 
Oppression. New York: Routledge. 
Ben-Moshe, Liat, and Sandy Magaña. 2014. “An Introduction to Race, Gender, and Disability: 
Intersectionality, Disability Studies, and Families of Color.” Women, Gender, and Families 
of Color 2(2): 105-114. 
Berndtson, Petri. 2010. “The Inspiration and the Expiration of Being.” In Thinking in Dialogue 
with the Humanities: Paths into the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. Bucharest: Zeta 
Books. 
Bleir, Ruth. 1984. Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and its Theories on Women. New 
York: Pergamon. 
Bordo, Susan. 1993. Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
Braidotti, Rosi. 2010. “The Politics of ‘Life Itself’ and New Ways of Dying.” In New 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, edited by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, 
201-18. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. 
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble, Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London: 
Routledge. 
___________. 1991. “Imitation and Gender Insubordination.” In Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, 
Gay Theories, edited by Diana Fuss, 13-31. New York: Routledge. 
Butler, Judith.1993. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. London: Routledge. 
Carastathis, Anna. 2013. “Basements and Intersections.” Hypatia 28(4): 698-715. 
Cavarero, Adriana. 2005. For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression. 
Trans. Paul A. Kottman. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Collins, Patricia Hill and Sirma Bilge. 2016. Intersectionality. Cambridge, UK, and Malden, 
MA: Polity Press. 
Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1991. “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color.” Stanford Law Review 43(6): 1241–1299. 
Damasio, Antonio. 1995. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, New York: 
Harper Perennial. 
______________. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness, New York: Harcourt Brace. 
De Leon, David. 1994. Leaders from the 1960s: A Biographical Sourcebook of American 
Activism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Diprose, Rosalyn. 2002. Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, and 
Levinas. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Dunn, Leslie C. and Nancy A. Jones. 1997. Embodied Voices: Representing Female Vocality in 
Western Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Eckert, Penelope and McConnell-Ginet, Sally. 2013. Language and Gender, 2nd Edition.  New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Fausto-Sterling, Anne. 2000. Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of 
Sexuality. New York: Basic Books. 
Foucault, Michel. 1973. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception. London: 
Tavistock. 
_____________. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Pantheon 
Books. 
Gatens, Moira, 1996. Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Gelb, Michael J. 1996. Body Learning: An Introduction to the Alexander Technique. 2nd edition. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
Gilligan, Carol and Flacks, David A. J. 2009. The Deepening Darkness: Patriarchy, Resistance, 
& Democracy's Future. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Glass, Ira. “If You Don’t Have Anything Nice to Say, SAY IT IN ALL CAPS: Freedom Fries,” 
January 23, 2015, on This American Life, produced by National Public Radio and WBEZ 
Chicago, podcast, MP3 audio, 8:30 http://www.npr.org/podcasts/510303/how-to-do-
everything. 
Gorodeisky, Kerein. 2016. “19th Century Romantic Aesthetics.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.  
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/aesthetics-19th-romantic/ 
Górska, Magdalena. 2016. Breathing Matters: Feminist Intersectional Politics of Vulnerability. 
Linköping: Linköping University. 
Gross, Terry. “From Upspeak to Vocal Fry: Are We Policing Young Women’s Voices?” July 23, 
2015, on Fresh Air, produced by National Public Radio, podcast, MP3 Audio, 36:38, 
https://www.npr.org/2015/07/23/425608745/from-upspeak-to-vocal-fry-are-we-policing-
young-womens-voices 
Grosz, Elizabeth. 1994. Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism. London: Routledge. 
______________. 2008. “Darwin and Feminism: Preliminary Investigations for a Possible 
Alliance.” In Material Feminisms, edited by Stacy Alamo and Susan Hekman, 23-51. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
______________. 2010. “Feminism, Materialism, and Freedom.” In New Materialisms: 
Ontology, Agency, and Politics, edited by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, 139-157. 
Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. 
Haraway, Donna. 1991. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Re-invention of Nature. London: 
Free Association Books. 
Harding, Sandra. 1991. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Hawke, Shé M. 2015. “Review of Breathing with Luce Irigary, edited by Emily A. Holmes and 
Lenart S ̌kof.” In Sophia. 54:603–605 DOI 10.1007/s11841-015-0502-0 
Husserl, Edmund. 1913/1963. Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Trans. W. 
R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Collier Books. 
Irigaray, Luce. 1985. This Sex which is Not One. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
___________. 1993. An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
___________. 1999. The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger. Austin: University of Texas 
Press. 
Lennon, Kathleen. 2014. "Feminist Perspectives on the Body." The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Available at 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/feminist-body/. 
Linklater, Kristin. 1976. Freeing the Natural Voice, 1st Edition. New York: Drama Book 
Specialists. 
_____________. 1992. Freeing Shakespeare’s Voice: The Actor’s Guide to Talking the Text. 
New York: Theatre Communications Group. 
_____________. 2006. Freeing the Natural Voice: Imagery and Art in the Practice of Voice and 
Language, Revised and Expanded. London: Nick Hern Books. 
_____________. 2009a. “The Alchemy of Breathing.” Breath in Action: The Art of Breath in 
Vocal and Holistic Practice, edited by Jane Boston and Rena Cook, London and 
Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. 
_____________. 2009b. “The European League Institute of the Arts.” 
https://www.linklatervoice.com/resources/articles-essays/40-the-european-league-of-
institutes-of-the-arts.  
_____________. 2010. "The Importance of Daydreaming." American Theatre 27(1): 43-44,124-
126. https://www.americantheatre.org/2010/01/01/the-importance-of-daydreaming/ 
 _____________. 2018. “Vocal Traditions: Linklater Voice Method.” Voice and Speech Review 
12(2): 1-10.  https://doi.org/10.1080/23268263.2018.1444558 
Lugones, María. 1987. “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception.” Hypatia 2(2): 
3-19. 
_____________. 2003. Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple 
Oppression. New York: Routledge. 
Kristeva, Julia. 1966/1986. “Word, Dialogue, and Novel.” The Kristeva Reader, edited by Toril 
Moi. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Malhotra, Sheena and Aimee Carillo Rowe. 2013. Silence, Feminism, Power: Reflections at the 
Edges of Sound. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Marcotte, Amanda. 2015. “The War on Female Voices is Just Another Way of Telling Women to 
Shut Up.” The Daily Dot. July 24. https://www.dailydot.com/via/vocal-fry-99-percent-
invisible-womens-voices/. 
Marwick, Arthur. 2011. The Sixties: Cultural Transformation in Britain, France, Italy and the 
United States, c. 1958 - c. 1974. Bloomsbury Reader. Ebook available at: 
https://books.google.com/books?id=etYOaWh1t4cC 
McCance, Dawne, ed. 2011. Kristin Linklater/The Santorini Voice Symposium. Special issue of 
Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature 44(1). 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1945/2012. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Donald A. Landes. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Ortega, Mariana. 2016. In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self. 
Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Quenqua, Douglas. 2012. “They’re, like, way ahead of the linguistic currrrve.” The New York 
Times. February 27. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/science/young-women-often-
trendsetters-in-vocal-patterns.html 
Riley, Erin. 2015. “Naomi Wolf misses the point about 'vocal fry'. It's just an excuse not to listen 
to women.” The Guardian. July 27. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/28/naomi-wolf-misses-the-point-
about-vocal-fry-its-just-an-excuse-not-to-listen-to-women 
Roberts, Dorothy. 1997. Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of 
Liberty. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Rousuck, J. Wynn. 1996. “Bringing new voices to theater: The Company of Women works on 
scripting a new play at the same time as it stages an all-female 'King Lear' and conducts 
workshops for women and girls.” The Baltimore Sun. 
Schlichter, Annette. 2014. “Un/Voicing the Self: Vocal Pedagogy and the Discourse-Practices of 
Subjectivation.” Postmodern Culture 24(3). https://muse.jhu.edu/. 
Silliman, Jael, Marlene Gerber Fried, Loretta Ross, and Elean Gutiérrez. 2016. Undivided 
Rights: Women of Color Organizing for Reproductive Justice. 2nd edition. Chicago: 
Haymarket Books. 
Stanislavski, Constantin. 1949/1994. Building A Character. New York: Routledge/Theatre Arts 
Books. 
Thomason, John. 2013. “A Historic Earmark.” The Nation 297(9/10): 5. 
Thompson, Rachel. 2018. “Stop Telling Women How They Should Talk.” August 22. Mashable. 
https://mashable.com/article/vocal-fry-upspeak-women/#eueOX_6pCSqo 
Tuana, Nancy. 2010. “Engendering Philosophy of Science.” In Philosophy of Science: Five 
Questions, edited by Robert Rosenberger. Copenhagen: Automatic/VIP Press. 
Weiss, Gail. 1999. Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality. New York and London: 
Routledge. 
Wollstonecraft, Mary. 1792/2004. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. London: Penguin 
Books. 
Wolf, Naomi. 2015 “Young women, give up the vocal fry and reclaim your strong female 
voice.” The Guardian. July 24. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/24/vocal-fry-strong-female-voice 
Young, Iris Marion. 2005. On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like a Girl” and Other 




1 The few exceptions include Cavarero (2005) Dunn and Jones (1997), and Malhotra and Rowe 
(2013) 
2 Schlichter 2014 provides a Foucauldian analysis of Linklater’s approach that raises many of the 
concerns we raise below regarding the invocations of the “natural” voice, but it does not address 
the questions of identity and structural injustice that we focus on here, and doesn’t draw 
explicitly on feminist philosophy. 
3 For a more comprehensive introduction to the field, see Lennon (2014). 
4 In full disclosure, it is important to acknowledge that co-author Hamel is writing from the 
perspective of praxis as well as theory: she is a Designated Linklater Freeing the Natural Voice 
teacher, and has been a practitioner, voice coach, and teacher of the work for about 15 years. 
That said, we are keenly aware that there is a challenge in the act of writing about Linklater’s 
Freeing the Natural Voice approach to voice training, which is, first and foremost, experiential, 
and takes place in situ, between teacher and student(s). FNV as a written text is in a sense 
necessarily incomplete: it is a guidebook to introduce the reader to “experiential awarenesses” in 
the body to create shifts in the voice; and there is a wide gap between simply reading and 
thinking about the work and its practice as lived experience. The work is altogether set up to be 
“practice first, theory second.” That said, this paper aims to address some of the fundamental 
philosophical assumptions that frame the work as a whole, which are asserted both in the text of 
                                               
                                                                                                                                                       
FNV as well as in the context of the work as taught in the classroom. In both the teaching 
practice as well as Linklater’s written expression of the work the precision of “causal thought” 
and a student’s understanding of the concepts of work are paramount; and we hold that there is 
value in examining those very concepts that lead to the felt-experience of the exercises. At the 
same time, we acknowledge also that the voice work often works in reverse, as it is clear from 
experience that a physical shift is equally likely to lead to a shift in thinking. This article aims, 
through the acting of writing about a practice (“thinking about the doing”–and acknowledging 
the inherent tension within this effort)–to challenge in part, perhaps ironically, an insistent 
mind/body dualism present in the approach, as well as to problematize the very concept of the 
“authentic self” behind the words that desires to speak: a self that is both assumed in and 
fundamental to its practice. 
5 The terms “uptalk” (upward inflection pattern) and “vocal fry” (also known as “creaky voice”) 
feverishly entered the mainstream lexicon beginning roughly around 2013, initiating the so-
called  “war on female voices” (Marcotte 2015) during which author Naomi Wolf notably wrote 
an article exhorting young women to reclaim their power by rejecting these so-called 
“destructive” speech patterns (Wolf 2015); in the same year This American Life on NPR featured 
a remarkable segment responding to the vitriolic letters from listeners criticizing the speaking 
voices of their young female presenters (Glass 2015). Significant debate has taken place on the 
subject, including both criticism which points to the sexism and oppression inherent in policing 
women’s voices (Gross 2015, Riley 2015), to the double-bind for the powerful female voice 
within a patriarchy (Thompson 2018), as well as the counter-suggestions that credit young 
female voices for being innovative, trendsetting, and full of linguistic ingenuity (Quenqua 2012; 
Arana 2013). 
6 In their extensive examinations of the gendering of language, Penelope Eckert and Sally 
McConnell-Ginet offer a useful recontextualization of the phenomenon of the questioning 
inflection pattern of “uptalk”: suggesting that in lieu of the familiar suggestion that it is a merely 
a sign of insecurity or feigned weakness in (primarily) women’s speech, that “the story is much 
more complex…[uptalk] can also be used to open up the conversational floor to other 
participants, to provide a space for others’ contributions, and also to show aggression. And its 
gendering may have at least as much to do with how others interpret [it] as with differences in 
who produces [it]” (2013, 144). 
 
